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Abstract 
Background: Inner speech has been linked to higher-order cognitive processes including 
‘theory of mind’, self-awareness and executive functioning, all of which are impaired in 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).  Individuals with ASD, themselves, report a propensity 
for visual rather than verbal modes of thinking.  This study explored the extent to which 
children with ASD used inner speech or visual imagery to support recall from short-term 
memory. 
Method:  Twenty-five children with ASD and 20 comparison children with moderate 
learning disabilities completed an immediate serial recall task, in which stimuli consisted of 
items with either phonologically similar features, visuo-spatially similar features or control 
items which were neither visuo-spatially nor phonologically similar.  
Results:  ASD and comparison participants, with verbal mental ages above 7 years, recalled 
phonologically similar stimuli less well than control stimuli, indicating that both groups were 
using inner speech to recode visually presented information into a phonological code.  In 
contrast, those participants with verbal mental ages below 7 years, whether with ASD or not, 
recalled visuo-spatially similar stimuli less well than control stimuli, indicating visual rather 
than phonological coding.  This developmental pattern mirrors that found in typically 
developing children.   
Conclusions: Under experimental conditions, individuals with ASD use inner speech to the 
same extent as individuals without ASD of a comparable mental age.   
 
Keywords: Autistic disorder, inner speech, phonological processing, visuo-spatial 
functioning, memory, cognition.   
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Introduction 
According to Baddeley’s (1986) working memory model, inner, or subvocal, speech is 
controlled by the phonological loop which is specialized for the short-term retention of 
verbally encoded information.  This phonological loop has two components: a phonological 
store, which holds information in a verbal/phonological form for a short period, and an 
articulatory control process which translates visual representations into a phonological code 
(to enter the store) and then acts to rehearse this material so as to reduce its decay in the store.  
This recoding of material into a verbal medium and its subsequent rehearsal is seen as an 
example of inner speech. 
Whilst inner speech within Baddeley’s (1986) model is thought to be independent of 
executive, self-regulative processes, the notion that it plays a key mediating role in higher 
mental functions was suggested by Vygotsky (1962) and, more recently, validated 
empirically in studies of executive functioning in adults (Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlam, 
2001; Cinan & Tanor, 2002).  According to Vygotsky’s socio-cultural approach, inner speech 
represents an internalised form of social-communicative dialogue with others, which serves 
to guide and regulate one’s ongoing behaviour by allowing multiple, alternative perspectives 
(originally manifested in external dialogue) upon a situation to be adopted.   
The implications of Vygotsky’s theory are relevant to our understanding of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD), a condition diagnosed on the basis of severe impairments in social 
interaction (DSM-IV, APA, 1994) and which, on the cognitive level, is characterised by 
deficits in higher mental functions such as executive functioning (e.g., Hill, 2004) and ‘theory 
of mind’ (ToM; e.g., Happé, 1995).  Theoretically, if the transition to dialogic modes of 
thinking in inner speech relies on an adequate experience of interpersonal relations, then 
individuals with ASD would be expected to show limited, if any, subvocal speech for the 
purpose of problem-solving.  Indeed, Russell, Jarrold and Hood (1999) suggest that the 
specific profile of executive dysfunction in ASD could be explained by an underlying paucity 
of inner speech use.  They argue that children with autism are challenged reliably only by 
those executive tasks which require the maintenance, in mind, of a novel, arbitrary rule and 
which also have non-verbal response modes.  Russell et al. suggest that such tasks require the 
ability to engage in self-talk in order to remind oneself of the rule to be followed.  A lack of 
spontaneous inner speech use could therefore explain the difficulties that individuals with 
ASD have in performing such tasks. 
Anecdotal evidence of a reduced propensity for inner speech use in ASD emerges from 
the autobiographical accounts of high-functioning individuals who report a predominantly 
visual thinking style (e.g. Grandin, 1991; Hurlburt, Happé & Frith, 1994).  The current 
experiment was designed therefore to assess the performance of individuals with ASD on a 
task which was amenable to either visual or verbal solutions (cf. Hurlburt et al., 1994).  
Specifically, the experiment assessed whether participants with ASD internally recode 
visually presented material into a verbal medium, or whether they, instead, rely solely on 
visual representations, as might be predicted on the basis of these introspective reports.   
There is good evidence that, in typical development, this recoding does not occur until 
approximately 7 years of age.  An early study by Flavell, Beach and Chinsky (1966), for 
example, analysed the lip movements of 5-, 7- and 10-year-olds for signs of subvocal 
rehearsal during a pictorial memory task and found such indications only in the two older 
groups.  A number of studies have also shown that young children’s memory for visually 
presented material is unaffected by the phonological properties of the items.  For instance, it 
is well established that the spoken duration of the items in verbal short-term memory tasks 
affects recall in adults, longer items (e.g. ‘bicycle’) being significantly less well remembered 
than short items (e.g. ‘cat’) (Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 1975).  Baddeley et al. 
interpreted this ‘word length effect’ (WLE) as a reflection of covert rehearsal processes.  
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Longer words are thought to be more difficult to recall because they tend to take longer to 
subvocally rehearse and are therefore subject to greater decay in the phonological store.  In 
other words, if inner speech (in the form of subvocally labeling pictures and then covertly 
rehearsing these labels) is being used then a WLE on recall for visually presented stimuli 
should be evident.  Hitch, Halliday, Dodd, and Littler (1989) however, only found reliable 
WLEs among 8-year-olds, and not 6-year-olds when to-be-remembered items were presented 
pictorially, suggesting that the younger group were not recoding the picture names into a 
phonological form, and that this recoding comes on line around 7 years of age (see also 
Conrad, 1971; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988). 
Before approximately age 7 years, children’s thought processes appear to be dominated 
by visual representations.  For example, Hitch, Woodin, and Baker (1989) found that 5-year-
olds’ serial recall performance for pictorially presented material was detrimentally affected 
by the visual similarity of the items to be recalled, but not their phonological similarity. In 
contrast, 11-year-olds showed the opposite pattern, recalling few items with phonologically 
similar names (e.g., cat, bat, hat), whilst remembering well items with similar visuo-spatial 
structures (e.g., a pen and a knife, presented at the same angle of orientation).  The 
‘phonological similarity effect’ (PSE) shown by these older children indicates a verbal 
representation of items in memory, since only information which has been translated from a 
visual to a verbal code could be affected by a manipulation of phonological structure.  The 
‘visuo-spatial similarity effect’ (VSE) shown by the young children indicates that, unlike the 
older children, items were represented only visually, having not undergone any active 
recoding into verbal form.  Whether or not the shift to phonological encoding strategies 
around age 7 years is an ‘all-or-nothing’ one, young children certainly appear to be restricted 
to representing items visually in short term memory (e.g., Brown, 1977; Hayes & Schulze, 
1977; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988).   
No study to date has assessed the effect of phonological and visual similarity on serial 
recall in ASD, although two published studies have assessed the WLE in ASD.  Russell, 
Jarrold & Henry (1996) found a WLE of the typical magnitude in their sample, whilst 
Whitehouse, Mayberry & Durkin (2006, Experiment 2) found a reduced WLE in children 
with ASD, concluding from this that individuals ‘with autism do not recruit inner speech in 
order to assist their performance in tasks involving pictorial memory…’ (p.8).  One difficulty 
with Whitehouse et al.’s Experiment 2, and hence the conclusion that children with ASD do 
not use inner speech, is the interpretation of the WLE itself.  As the authors note, the 
suggestion that WLE is the reflection of covert articulatory rehearsal processes is 
controversial.  It may be that rather than resulting from rehearsal processes during the 
retention period, WLEs are driven by overt articulation processes during recall (Cowan et al., 
1992; Henry, 1991).  That is, the more time it takes to articulate words at recall the more 
time the information in the recall list must be held in the phonological store, and the more it 
is subject to potential decay.  Such output effects would have little to do with the rehearsal 
strategy (inner speech) during the retention phase, therefore.   
Because of these uncertainties regarding the basis of the WLE, the most widely 
accepted evidence for the verbal encoding of information in memory research is, as noted 
earlier, a demonstration of the PSE.  Unlike the WLE, the PSE cannot be explained in terms 
of a disruption to output processes (i.e. overt articulation during recall) because items are 
typically matched for syllable length, and therefore spoken duration.  Given the fact that the 
PSE, unlike the WLE, is an uncontroversial indicator of inner speech use, we decided to 
adopt the methodology used by Hitch, Woodin and Baker (1989) in their study of typically 
developing (TD) children.  A group of children with ASD and a matched comparison group 
undertook a serial recall task involving lists of items which were either visually similar, 
phonologically similar or neither visually nor phonologically similar.  If children with ASD 
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do not spontaneously recruit inner speech to mediate this task, then they should exhibit a 
lesser PSE than comparison children.  If children with ASD do not encode information 
verbally then it remains an open question whether they encode it visuo-spatially, like TD 
children below approximately 7 years of age (cf. Whitehouse et al., 2006, p. 8). The inclusion 
of a condition involving sets of visuo-spatially similar items provides a direct test of this 
possibility since, if children with ASD are using a visuo-spatial encoding strategy, their recall 
of items with similar visuo-spatial properties should be detrimentally affected. 
Specifically, this study explored whether children with ASD spontaneously recruit 
inner speech to mediate their recall from short-term memory, or whether they instead rely on 
the use of visuo-spatial representations as suggested by Whitehouse et al. (2006) and as might 
be predicted both on the basis of the introspective reports of individuals with ASD (Grandin, 
1991; Hurlburt et al., 1994) and on theoretical accounts of the typical development of 
internalised speech (Vygotsky, 1962).  
Method 
Participants   
Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the joint South London and 
Maudsley NHS Trust/Institute of Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee.  Twenty-five 
children with ASD and 20 comparison children participated in this study, after 
parents/guardians had given written, informed consent for their children to be included.  The 
participants in the ASD group had received formal diagnoses, by a trained psychiatrist or 
pediatrician, of autistic disorder (n = 22), Asperger’s disorder (n = 2) or pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS; n = 1) according to established 
criteria (DSM-IV; APA, 1994).  All participants in this group attended specialist autism 
schools, which required a diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s syndrome or PDD-NOS for entry 
into the school.  The comparison group consisted of 18 children with generalised learning 
disability, who were attending specialist schools for pupils with learning difficulties, and two 
TD children who were recruited for comparison with those (two) children in the ASD group 
who achieved full-scale IQ scores of over 100.  Children with a primary diagnosis of 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or who had a primary specific language 
impairment (SLI) were not included in the study, since it was felt that individuals with 
ADHD would have difficulty conforming to the task and that individuals with SLI would not 
form a fair comparison group, given their established difficulties with phonological 
processing (see Leonard, 2000).  Verbal and non-verbal abilities were assessed by an 
appropriate measure for the chronological age of each participant.  Thus, 23 (out of 25) 
children with ASD and 18 (out of 20) comparison children received a short form of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition UK (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991), 
consisting of Information, Vocabulary, Picture Completion and Block Design subtests.  The 
IQ estimate gained from this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  The verbal and 
non-verbal abilities of the four remaining children (two from each group) were assessed by 
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (Wechsler, 1990).  Due 
to limited child availability, two comparison participants only received assessment of verbal 
abilities by the WISC-III.  Following Field (2005) all effect sizes in this study are reported in 
terms of r.  The groups were matched on chronological age and verbal mental age (VMA): 
chronological age, t(43) = 0.12, p = .91, r = .05; VMA, t(43) = 0.63, p = .53, r = .12; verbal 
IQ, t(43) = 0.90, p = .37, r = .14; performance IQ, t(41) = 0.37, p = .71, r = .09; and full-scale 
IQ, t(41) = 0.62, p = .54, r =  .12.1  Participant details are reported in Table 1.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Stimuli were 24 pictures, similar to those used by Hitch, Woodin and Baker (1989), 
divided into three sets: those with phonologically similar labels (bat, cat, hat, mat, map, rat, 
tap, cap), those with visually similar appearances, all presented at the same angle, (key, 
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spoon, pen, knife, tie, bone, spade) and control items with no phonological or visual 
similarity (drum, shoe, fork, bell, leaf, bird, lock, net).  All items were one syllable in length 
and matched for word frequency as indexed by Kucera-Francis (1967) and Thorndike-Lorge 
(1944) counts, and for imageability and concreteness as reported in the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). A multivariate analysis of these four measures 
across the three stimulus types revealed a non-significant main effect of stimulus type using 
Wilks’ criterion, F(8, 34) = 0.76, p = .64, confirming the adequacy of this matching.2  Fifteen 
of the 24 pictures were drawn from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) standardized set.  
Nine of the pictures (tap, rat, key, spade, cap, fork, mat, net, map) were not available from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s set and so were either hand drawn or selected from Microsoft 
Clipart so as to match as closely as possible the style of Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s 
pictures.  Figure 1 provides examples of the stimuli used in each condition.   
Pictures were mounted in rows on black card and covered individually by coloured 
squares of card which could be lifted to reveal the pictures underneath.   
Design and Procedure 
Participants took part in each condition (phonological, control, visual), with the order 
of presentation counterbalanced.  Short-term memory for the materials in each condition was 
assessed using an incremental span procedure.  Items were organized into rows, the sequence 
length of which varied from two to eight pictures per row.  There were four trials (i.e. rows) 
at each sequence length.  Items in each trial were revealed in turn for approximately one 
second.  After presentation of the last item in each trial, the experimenter pointed to the cover 
of the first picture and said ‘which one was here?’ and, having been offered an answer, 
continued down the row pointing to each picture cover in turn.  Each trial was considered to 
have been successfully completed if all items were recalled in correct order.  If at least one of 
the four trials at a given sequence length had been successfully completed then the participant 
was given another set of (four) trials at a greater sequence length.  When none of the trials at 
a given sequence length were successfully completed, the participant moved onto the next 
condition.  Each condition began with three-item sequences (i.e., four trials of three items).   
If none of the trials were successfully completed at this sequence length then participants 
were given a set of trials with two-item sequences.  All conditions were completed in one 
session, which lasted approximately 20-25 minutes. 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room in their school.  They were first 
shown and asked to name each picture from the task.  Any failures to produce the designated 
name for each picture were corrected.  This was done in order to ensure that the correct 
labels, which had been matched for syllable length, were being used.  If, for example, a child 
had consistently used an incorrect/alternative label (e.g., ‘baseball bat’, for the item ‘bat’) in a 
particular condition, then any findings would be confounded by uncontrolled word length 
effects.    
Following the naming phase, participants completed an unrelated task (as part of a 
battery of tasks) which took approximately five minutes to complete.  They were then given a 
practice trial of the experimental task, consisting of four two-item sequences.  If, during this 
practice trial or at any other point in the test, the participants overtly articulated the labels of 
pictures during the sequence presentation they were instructed to remain silent until all the 
pictures in a trial had been seen. 
Data Scoring and Analysis 
 Hitch, Woodin, and Baker (1989) did not use a span procedure in their experiment, 
but rather presented individuals with a set of trials of a fixed list length.  They then coded 
recall in terms of number of items correctly recalled across each condition.  However, such 
an approach is not appropriate in a span procedure of the form employed here, because it 
risks giving undue weight to trials at longer as opposed to shorter list lengths.  Rather, we 
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adopted the preferred method in the literature of scoring span performance (Conway et al., 




Given that TD children below approximately 7 years of age characteristically display a 
VSE, indicating that they mediate this kind of task not by phonological recoding but by 
relying on visuo-spatial representations of items, we investigated whether experimental and 
comparison participants at the equivalent developmental level (i.e., with mental ages below 7 
years) showed this same pattern of performance in our study. To explore this issue we 
subdivided participants according to their VMA and compared the recall performance of 
participants with VMAs over 7 years (high VMA group) to that of participants with VMAs 
under 7 years (low VMA group).  There were 32 participants (18 ASD and 14 comparison) in 
the high VMA group and 13 participants (7 ASD and 6 comparison) in the low VMA group.   
 Data were therefore analysed using a 2  2  3 repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
diagnostic group (ASD/comparison) and VMA group (under 7 years/over 7 years) as the 
between-participants factors and with condition (phonological, visuo-spatial and control) as 





The ANOVA indicated that the main effect of condition was not significant, showing 
that participants’ recall performance was not reliably affected, overall, by the type of 
stimulus, F(2, 82) = 1.92, p = .15, r = .15.  The main effect of diagnostic group was also not 
significant, indicating that participants with ASD showed the same level of recall 
performance, across conditions, as did comparison participants, F(1, 41) = 0.91, p = .35, r = 
.15.  The main effect of VMA group was significant, however, reflecting the superior overall 
performance of the high VMA group, F(1, 41) = 6.42, p = .02, r = .37. 
There was no significant interaction between condition and diagnostic group, indicating 
that participants with ASD showed the same pattern of recall performance as did comparison 
participants, F(2, 82) = 0.43, p = .65, r = .07.  There was, however, a significant interaction 
between condition and VMA group, F(2, 82) = 7.54, p = .001, r = .29.   To break down this 
interaction, within-participants contrasts were performed comparing the recall of 
phonologically similar and visuo-spatially similar stimuli to control stimuli, by each VMA 
group independently.  The first contrast revealed that, for those participants with VMAs 
above 7 years (high VMA group), the recall of phonologically similar stimuli was 
significantly lower than the recall of control stimuli, F(1, 31) = 15.74, p < .001, r = .58.  The 
recall of visuo-spatially similar stimuli did not differ significantly from the recall of control 
stimuli in these participants, however, F(1, 31) < 0.01, p > .99, r < .01.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the performance of ASD and comparison participants, with VMAs over 7 years, on the 
experimental task. The second contrast revealed the opposite pattern of performance by 
participants with VMAs below 7 years (low VMA group).  In these participants, the recall of 
visuo-spatially similar stimuli was significantly poorer than the recall of control stimuli, F(1, 
12) = 4.59, p = .05, r = .53, whilst the recall of phonologically similar stimuli did not differ 
significantly from the recall of control stimuli, F(1, 12) = 0.18, p = .68, r = .12.  Figure 3 
shows the performance of participants, collapsed across diagnostic groups, with VMAs over 
and under 7 years.  
Next, between-participants contrasts were performed comparing the recall performance 
of each VMA group (high/low) on each of the three stimulus conditions.   These contrasts 
revealed that, compared to participants in the low VMA group, participants in the high VMA 
group were significantly superior in their recall of control, F(1, 43) = 5.88, p = .02, r = .35 
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and visual, F(1, 43) = 11.85, p = .001, r = .46, stimuli.  The two VMA groups of participants 
did not differ significantly, however, in their recall of phonological stimuli F(1, 43) = 0.27, p 
= .61, r = .08.   
Finally, neither the two-way interaction between diagnostic group and VMA group, 
F(1, 41) = 0.07, p = .80, r = .04, nor the three-way interaction between diagnostic group, 
VMA group and condition, F(2, 82) = 0.52, p = .60, r = .08, was significant, indicating that 
participants with ASD and comparison participants were similar in terms of overall levels of 
performance and  patterns of performance across conditions, regardless of which VMA group 
they were in. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment clearly show that children with ASD do not differ from 
the comparison individuals with moderate learning difficulties in their ability to 
spontaneously recruit inner speech to mediate the experimental short-term memory task.  For 
children with VMAs over 7 years, in both the experimental and comparison groups, 
phonologically similar pictorial stimuli were significantly less well remembered than control 
stimuli (see Figure 2).  Indeed, the effect size (r) for the contrast between phonological and 
control conditions, in those participants in the high VMA group, was .58, a magnitude 
considered large (Cohen, 1992).  As noted above, in short-term memory research, such a PSE 
is arguably the ‘gold standard’ for demonstrating intact verbal recoding of visual information.  
Finding a typical PSE in children with ASD therefore provides the best evidence yet of 
unimpaired phonological loop functioning in this disorder.   
Our results also provided some evidence regarding the development of inner speech in 
children with ASD and children with moderate learning disability.  As highlighted above, TD 
children do not begin to spontaneously recode visual information into a verbal medium until 
roughly 7 years of age (Flavell et al., 1966; Hitch, Halliday et al., 1989).  Before this, visual 
information is represented in terms of its visuo-spatial properties.  Exactly this pattern of 
performance was observed among the participants in our sample when they were divided 
around a developmental level of 7 years mental age. Those participants with VMAs above 7 
years clearly recalled phonologically similar items least well, indicating a verbal 
representation of items.  In contrast, participants with VMAs below 7 years showed no 
detrimental effects of phonological similarity, relative to control condition performance.  
Instead, these individuals showed significantly poorer performance on visually confusable 
items (see Figure 3).  Consequently, these patterns of performance are remarkably similar to 
those shown by TD 5- and 11-year-olds in Hitch, Woodin and Baker’s (1989) study 
suggesting that among individuals with learning disability, whether with autism or not, it is 
developmental level rather than chronological age that predicts short-term memory 
competence (cf. Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 2000).   
These findings runs counter to those of Whitehouse et al. (2006), who found a reduced 
word length effect in children with ASD.  As noted above, however, the controversy 
regarding the suggestion that such length effects reflect covert articulatory processes, leads us 
to believe that the phonological similarity effect, which was not reduced in children with 
ASD in this study, provides a purer measure of inner speech processes.  One further 
difference between the current study and that of Whitehouse et al. is in the type of 
comparison group employed.  Whereas the comparison group assessed in this study 
comprised individuals matched with the ASD group on chronological and verbal mental age 
(and hence verbal IQ), Whitehouse et al. included only a (TD) comparison group matched 
with their ASD group on VMA, but not chronological age.  It could, therefore, have been the 
verbal IQ decrement shown by the participants with ASD, rather than their diagnostic status 
per se, in their study that was driving performance differences between groups on 
experimental tasks (cf. Henry, 2001).   
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The current findings also run counter to self-reported propensity of individuals with 
autism for a tendency toward visual thinking.  The finding of a predominantly verbal solution 
to the task in participants with ASD, despite the fact that visual mediation was equally 
applicable, seems to rule out the possibility that visual thinking is the only problem-solving 
strategy available to people with this disorder.  One speculative explanation is that people 
with ASD actually do implement inner speech in their everyday lives but have difficulty 
(meta)representing and, as a result, reporting their own internal worlds as consisting of such 
dialogue.  Perhaps people with autism, given their ToM difficulties, come to see thoughts as 
synonymous with ‘pictures in the head’ and hence report their own thoughts as consisting in 
such images even when, in reality, they consist in linguistic forms. This suggestion is 
compatible with the finding of Flavell, Green, Flavell and Grossman (1997) that young TD 
children, at an age before they consistently pass ToM tasks, are unable to distinguish their 
visual from verbal thought processes.   
Perhaps the idea of an impoverished self-concept in ASD, rather than a lack of inner 
speech use, could also partially explain the contrast between the performance of participants 
on our memory task and their typically poor performance on executive functioning tasks 
which also seem to require inner speech use (Russell et al., 1999).  This argument revolves 
around the idea that the nature or quality of inner speech may vary according to the 
robustness of one’s self-concept, whereby (inner) language can serve as a problem-solving 
device, even in individuals with diminished self-awareness, without being truly dialogic in 
nature.  Inner speech in this case could be said to be ‘for oneself’ rather than ‘to oneself’ and 
perhaps it is the latter type of internal dialogue which is required to remind oneself of which 
rule to follow in executive functioning tasks.  Our study did not allow an assessment of the 
quality of the inner speech used by participants with ASD.  What is clear from our study, 
however, is that the mechanism for engaging in inner speech is unimpaired in ASD and that 
children with this disorder are quite capable of implementing verbal representations to 
























Intact inner speech use     10 
Correspondence to 
David Williams, Social, Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of 
























American Psychiatric Association. (1994).  Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders.  4
th
 ed.  (DSM-IV).  Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Baddeley, A.D. (1986).  Working memory.  Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A.D, Thompson, N., & Buchanan, M. (1975). Word length and the structure of 
short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14, 575-589. 
Baddeley, A., Chincotta, D., & Adlam, A. (2001).  Working memory and the control of 
action: Evidence from task switching.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
130, 641-657. 
Brown, R.M. (1977).  An examination of the visual and verbal coding processes in preschool 
children. Child Development, 48, 38-45. 
Coltheart, M. (1981).  The MRC Psycholinguistic Database.  The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 33A, 497-505. 
Cinan, S., & Tanor, O.O. (2002).  An attempt to discriminate different types of executive 
functions in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.  Memory, 10, 277-289. 
Cohen, J. (1992).  A power primer.  Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159. 
Conrad, R. (1971).  The chronology of the development of covert speech in children. 
Developmental Psychology, 5, 398-405. 
Conway, A.R.A., Kane, M.J., Bunting, M.F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., & Engle, R.W. 
(2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user's guide. 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12, 769-786. 
Cowan, N., Day, L., Saults, J.S., Keller, T.A., Johnson, T., & Flores, L. (1992).  The role of 
verbal output in the effects of word length on immediate memory.  Journal of memory 
and language, 31, 74-79. 
Field, A.P. (2005).  Discovering statistics using SPSS (2
nd
 ed.).  Sage Publications. 
Intact inner speech use     11 
Flavell, J.H., Beach, D.R. & Chinsky, J.M. (1966).  Spontaneous verbal rehearsal in a 
memory task as a function to age.  Child Development, 37, 283-299. 
Flavell, J.H., Green, F.L., Flavell, E.R. & Grosmann, J.B. (1997).  The development of 
children’s knowledge about inner speech. Child Development, 68, 39-47. 
Grandin, T. (1991).  Harvard Mental Health Letter: Overcoming autism: A first person 
account. 
Happé, F. (1995).  The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind task performance 
of subjects with autism.  Child Development, 66, 843-855. 
Hayes, D.S. & Schulze, S.A. (1977).  Visual encoding in preschoolers’ serial retention.  Child 
Development, 48, 1066-1070. 
Henry, L.A. (1991). The effects of word length and phonemic similarity in young children’s 
short-term memory.  Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43A, 35-52.  
Henry, L.A. (2001). How does the severity of a learning disability affect working memory 
performance? Memory, 9, 233-247. 
Hill, E. (2004).  Executive dysfunction in autism.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 26-32. 
Hitch, G.J., Halliday, M.S., Dodd, A., & Littler, J.E. (1989).  Development of rehearsal in 
short-term memory: Differences between spoken and pictorial stimuli.  British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 7, 347-362.  
Hitch, G.J., Halliday, M.S., Schaafstal, A.M., & Heffernan, T. M. (1991). Speech, 'inner 
speech', and the development of short-term memory: Effects of picture-labelling on 
recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, 220-234. 
Hitch, G.J., Halliday, M.S., Schaafstal, A.M., & Schraagen, J.M.C. (1988). Visual working-
memory in young children. Memory and Cognition, 16, 120-132. 
Hitch, G.J., Woodin, M.E., & Baker, S. (1989).  Visual and phonological components of 
working memory in children.  Memory and Cognition, 17, 175-185. 
Hurlburt, R.T. (1990).  Sampling normal and schizophrenic inner experience.  Plenum Press: 
New York. 
Hurlburt, R.T., Happè, F., & Frith, U. (1994).  Sampling the form of inner experience in three 
adults with Asperger syndrome.  Psychological Medicine, 24, 385-395. 
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A.D., & Hewes, A.K. (2000). Verbal short-term memory deficits in 
down syndrome: A consequence of problems in rehearsal? Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 41, 233-244. 
Jarrold, C., & Brock, J. (2004).  To match or not to match?  Methodological issues in autism 
related research.  Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34, 81-86. 
Kucera, H., & Francis, W.N. (1967). Computational analysis of present-day American 
English. Providence RI: Brown University Press. 
Leonard, L.B. (2000).  Children with Specific Language Impairment. MIT Press 
Russell, J., Jarrold, C., & Henry, L. (1996).  Working memory in children with autism and 
moderate learning difficulties.  Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 673-
686. 
Russell, J., Jarrold, C., & Hood, B. (1999).  Two intact executive capacities in children with 
autism: implications for the core executive dysfunctions in the disorder.  Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 103-112. 
Sattler, J.M. (1992).  Assessment of children: WISC-III and WPPSI-R supplement.  USA: 
Jerome M. Sattler Publishers Inc. 
Snodgrass, J.G., & Vanderwart, M. (1980).  A standardised set of 260 pictures: Norms for 
name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 174-215. 
Thorndike, E.L., & Lorge, I. (1944). The teacher’s word book of 30,000 words. New York: 
Teacher’s College, Columbia University. 
Intact inner speech use     12 
Vygotsky, L. (1962).  Thought and language.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Wechsler, D. (1992).  Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children.  (3
rd
 ed.), London, UK: The 
Psychological Corporation 
Wechsler, D. (1990).  Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (UK 
Edition). Sidcup, Kent: The Psychological Corporation 
Whitehouse, A.J.O., Mayberry, M.T., & Durkin, K. (2006).  Inner speech impairments in 
autism.   Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47, 857-866. 
Intact inner speech use     13 
Footnotes 
1. Given that performance and, hence full-scale, IQ data were not available for two 
comparison participants we wanted to rule out the possibility that our groups could have 
become significantly different from each other on these ability measures if these individuals 
had been assessed.  To ensure this, we arbitrarily assigned the two comparison participants 
with the minimum performance IQ score possible (45 points) and re-analysed the data.  
Group comparisons on these measures yielded the following results: performance IQ, t(44) = 
0.79, p = .44, r = .11; full-scale IQ, t(44) = 0.88, p = .38, r = .13.  The effect sizes for both of 
these comparisons were small (Cohen, 1992) and thus, both groups would still have been 
well matched even if these two comparison participants had extremely low performance IQs. 
 
2. Imageability and concreteness scores were not available for the item cap, and consequently 
this item is not included in the multivariate analysis reported in the text.  However, an 
analysis of the two indices of frequency that included this item again showed a non-
significant multivariate effect of stimulus type using Wilks’ criterion, F(4, 40) = 0.974, p = 
.43. 
 
3.  Whilst Conway et al. (2005) argue that totaling the numbers of trials on which serial recall 
was completely correct in each condition is a superior method for scoring span performance 
than simply calculating ‘span’ in terms of the longest length list on which any trial was 
successfully completed, they also suggest an alternative method, namely ‘partial-credit 
scoring’.  Here, participants are given a score of one for every successful trial, plus a 
proportional score for every unsuccessful trial that corresponds to the proportion of items 
within each that were recalled in the correct position.  Item data were unavailable for four of 
our participants with ASD and so we could not additionally analyse the data using this 
scoring method.  However, within the remaining sample (n = 41), the correlations between 
participant performance, in each stimulus condition, using the partial-credit scoring method 
and the trial-scoring method (adopted here) were very high, confirming the validity of our 
scoring method: control condition, r = .95; phonological condition, r = .89; visual condition, 
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15.99 71.56
a 
(44 – 111) 
18.57 
a 













Figure 1. Examples of experimental materials 
Figure 2. Mean number of trials recalled by ASD and comparison participants with VMAs 
over 7 years.  (Error bars represent one SE of the mean). 
Figure 3. Number of trials completed in each condition by participants, collapsed across 
diagnostic groups, with VMAs under and over 7 years. (Error bars represent one SE of the 
mean). 
 




Visuo-spatially Similar Stimuli: 
 
 
Phonologically Similar Stimuli: 
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